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In the history of the border town of Columbus, New
Mexico, the morning of March 9, 1916 will be remembered
forever. It was on this particular date that Francisco
"Pancho" Villa and his cabafLeria (cavalry) bo1dly crossed
the United States border under the cover of early morning
darkness. Upon their arrival at Columbus, for more than two
hours Villa and his force of 485 men proceeded to wreak
havoc on the 400 residents and 300 soldiers garrisoned
adjacent to the town at Camp Furlong. By 7:30 A.M., the
rallying efforts of the garrison's machine-gun troop forced
the Villistas into a hasty retreat. The remains of the
Commercial- Hotel were sti1l smoldering while the bodies of
eighteen Americans and more than ninety Villistas 1ay strewn
about the dusty streets.l This was a terrible incident that
took the people of both Columbus and the entire United
States by surprise. This attack raj-ses the question why
Villa, the former leader of the powerful Divisi6n del Norte,
would attack the sleepy little town of Columbus and
jeopardlze hj-mself to retaliati-on by the United States?
The years that followed the raid were fi11ed with
conflicting rumors about Villa's true intentions. There
was, also, much debate as to the number of Villistas
involved, the role Pancho Vil1a actually played in the raid,
and whether his plans were successful. These rumors and
lHal-deen Braddy, Pancho VifLa at Columbus: The Rard of L9L6
Restudred (E] Paso: Texas Western College Press ' L965, , 2930.
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controversies have 1ed many writers since that time to
interpret the actions of Vil1a as being those of a terrorist
bent on revenge and bloodshed. Perhaps the labeling of
Vil1a as a terrorist allowed the writers of the day to bring
an element of foreboding to their stories. Nevertheless,
they never ful1y developed the reasons behind the attack.
After reading contemporary articles in the newspapers, such
as "Bandit and Followers Creep into Columbus and Start
Massacrer "2 many Americans

did not feel the need to

examine

the matter any further.
Although more than eighty years have passed, the rumors
and controversies of the event can now be evaluated more
objectively. Through the deconstruction of the events that
unfolded before and during that night in New Mexico,
historians can now piece together a more accurate view of
the reasons behind the attack on Columbus. Only through
this approach can one find and establish the major truths
hidden beneath the surface. However, to ful1y comprehend
the incidents that led to the assault on New Mexico one must
examine the events that preceded Vill-ars raid. It is
important to look at Pancho Vil1a's career, rising from
outlaw to revolutionary general.
In 1894, a young peasant farmer named Doroteo Arango
returned from a long day in the fields to find his twelve2"Bandit and Followers Creep into Columbus and Start
Massacrer" New York Times, 10 March L9L6, 1.
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year-oId sj-ster hiding behind their mother.3 Setrora Arango
was trying to keep the hacienda owner, Don Augustln L6pez
Negrete, from abducting her daughter. The enraqed Doroteo

retrieved a pistol and shot L6pez Negrete in the foot.4 The
young peasant did not wait around to see what the
authorities might do to him. Without hesitation, Doroteo
packed his meager belongings and headed for the hills.
For the next fifteen years, Doroteo 1ed the life of an
outl-aw. Changing his name to Pancho Vi11a, the former
indentured servant joined a gang of cattle rustlers and
gained widespread renown.5 The primary targets of Vil-Ia's
cattle rustlJ-ng ventures were the wealthy landowners
throughout northern Mexico.6 vilIa learned how to survive
and prosp€r, despite the growing number of wanted posters
with his likeness on them.
After years of hiding from authorities and robbing the
wealthy, Villa met a man who changed his l-ife. Although
Villa had once tried to steal from him, the intellectual Don
Abraham Gonzdlez i-mpressed the young outlaw and convinced
Vi11a to join "the revolution for the peop1e."7 With the
support of Gonz61ez, Vil1a became a 1ow ranking officer in
3Martln Luis Guzm6n, Memoirs of Pancho Vil-l-a, trans.

Virginia H Taylor (Austin: University of Texas Press, 196s),
3.
apriedrich Katz , The Life and ?rmes of Pancho ViJ-l-a
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 2-3.
SMartln Luis Guzm6n, 4-5
6Katz, 70.
TMartln Luis Guzm6n,

21-.
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the loca1 m11itia.8 Ironically, this militia was funded by
landowners that Vitla had stolen cattle from just months
before.

Within two short years, Vi11a was promoted to the rank
of general in the revolutionary military. By 1,914, Vi11a
was in charge of 40,000 troops and had become one of the
most successful leaders of the Mexican Revolution.9 Vil1a
was at the apex of his power and popularity. Seen as a sort
of Robin Hood by the poor, Vil1a shed his reputation as an
outlaw and became an admirable and, seemingly, invincible
leader.10 Unfortunately for Villa, his glorious
accomplishments woul-d soon prove to be fleeting.

In retrospect, L975 was not a successful year for
Pancho Villa.
Problems had been brewing between Villa and
his nominal superior, Venustiano Carranza, for the better
part of a year. Although both Villa and Carranza had fought
to rid Mexico of Victoriano Huerta's reglme, Vi11a
associated himself with the cause of the land-less peasants
that worked their ent j-re lives for weal-thy landowners.
Carranza, by contrast, was a wealthy hacendado (l-andowner)
who was never a proponent of democracy. Carranza supported
the Mexican elite and large business. He never made any

8rbid.,22-24.
9clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United
States and the Mexican IrreguLars (London: Collier-Macmillan
Ltd. , L969) , L"77 .
loKatz

,

74.
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for social reform and failed to gain the support of
the peasant majority. ll
After Huerta's power had waned significantly, the
revolutionary leaders of Mexico agreed to hold a conventj-on
in Mexico City to discuss a future qovernment for their
country. According to Clarence Clendenen, the convention
was l-ater moved to Aguascalientes due to Pancho Villa's
enormous influence and power.12 Carranza, possibly looking
demands

for any excuse to detach himself from the largely uneducated
group of revolutj-onaries 1ed by Emiliano Zapata and Pancho
Vil1a, chose not to attend the convention. In additj-on,
Carranza refused to recognize any agreement made at the
convention and openly broke off relations with the other
revolutionary groups.13 When the convention chose Eulalio
Guti6rrez as the next president of Mexico, a man known to
have close ti-es to the Villista cause, Carranza's posture
stiffened, thus prolonging Mexico's internal confl-icts and
eliminating any hope of a peaceful settlement.14
For several months there was Iittle contact between the
Althougth Vi11a challenged
Carrancistas and the Villistas.
the convention with the radical proposal that both he and
Carranza be execuLed 1n order to avoid prolonging the
revolution, the delegates did not take him seriously
11rbid., L99-20312clendenen, Blood on the Border,
l3Martln Luis Guzm5n, 342-343.
14clendenen, Bl-ood on the Border,

L71.
1,77.

and
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tensions between the two remained hiqh.15 It was during

this time that the armies of both men were regrouping and
preparing to resolve the issue of leadership on the
battlefield.
Accounts suggest that ViIIa and his Divisi6n del Norte
were well prepared to face the Carrancj-sta forces.

The army

was equipped with 40r 000 soldiers, a surplus of arms and

ammunition, locomotj-ves, artillery,

and hundreds of box-cars

containing valuable provisions and supplies.16 Added to
this, many Villistas and Americans alike assumed that Villa
had the full support of the United States.17
Villa had maintained close relations with General Hugh
Scott, the commander of the U.S. forces along the border,

later became the United States Chief of Staff. General
Scott had a sincere admiration for Pancho Vill-a and felt
that he was the one revolutionary in Mexico who managed to
sustain order in the states under his control. Scott also
maintained that Vil-Ia had always been helpful to the United
States.18 V111a, in the eyes of General Scott, was honest
and exceedingly fair in dealing with the demands made of him
by the Unj-ted States. Even after the United States
recognized Carranza as presi-dent of Mexico in October of
who

l5Martln Luis Guzm6n, 348.
16clendenen, Blood on the Border, 777-178.
lTclarence Clendenen, The United States and Pancho VilLa: A
Study in UnconventionaT DipTomacy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press , L96L) , 153-154.
18Katz,
3L8-319.
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1915, Vil1a continued to trust General Scott who wrote in

his memoirs that "No white man, no Negror rro Indian, no
Moro, nor any person, however humble, ever had as much right
as Villa to believe I had turned agrainst him, yet he
telegraphed a mutual friend in New York that General Scott
was the only honest man north of Mexico.." 19
With all of these factors combi-ned Pancho Vi1la and the
Divisi6n de1 Norte appeared to be unstoppable against
Carranza's forces. Vi1la and his troops left Mexico City in
April of 1915 and headed south towards the Guanajuato
capital of Celaya. Having met little resistance up to that
point, Vi1la expected a swift victory over t.he remaining
territories.20 Unfortunately for Vi11a, the commanding
Carrancista general at Celaya was a very capable leader
named Alvaro Obreg6n.
Obreg6n was an adept individual who studied the
military strategies being implemented in Europe as World War
I raged far away. He recogrnized that at the beginning of
the war both sides had relied heavily on cavalry, but large
numbers of men 1n trenches surrounded by machj-ne guns and
barbed wire could simply eliminate any threat of cavalry
charges.2l Pancho Villa, in contrast to Obreg6n, had not
l9Quoted in Erank Tompkins', Chasing ViLla: The Story Behind

the Story of Pershing's Exped:tion Into Mexico (Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania: The Military Service PublishingT Co., l-935),
35.
20c1endenen, BLood
2lKatz, 488.

on the Barder,

L79.
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paid attention to strategic developments outside of Mexico.
Unfortunately, his lack of knowledge in world affairs and
current military strategies would prove to be his downfalI.
Obreg6n, anticipating that the cavalry dependent Vi11a
would not deviate from his normal mode of operatj-on, applied
European trench warfare at the town of Celaya. The town and
surrounding area were covered with irrigation ditches that
criss-crossed a large expanse of farmland. These ditches
allowed Obreg6n to transform them with mj-nimal effort j-nto
heavily fortified trenches.22 He then set a trap for Villa
and his men.
The only weakness in Obreg6n's plan lay in the fact

that the supplies that his army relied on had to be brought
by rail from Vera Cruz through terrj-tories held by Zapata
and Vi1la. The Villistas and Zapatistas could have easily
severed the communication and supply Iines to Obreg6n's
forces.23 Villa's top advisor, Felipe Angeles suggested
that Vil1a devise such a pIan. An overconfident Vi11a
dismissed Angeles' suggestion, referring to his adversary as
"El Perfumado", as if Obreg6n were more of a show piece than
a battle hardened generaI.24
On the morning of April 6, Vil1a and his men attacked
the entrenched soldiers head-on. This particular tactic had
22,foseph

A. Stout, Border ConfLict: Vil-Listas, Carrnacistas,
and the Punitive Expedit:.on; 79L5-i-920 (Texas: Texas

Christian University Press,L999) , 14-15.
23rbid, 15.
24Katz, 488.
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given Villars Divisi6n del Norte an undefeated record
throughout the revoIution.25 The entrenched men of
Obregr6n's forces held their ground and were eventual-Iy able

to push back Vil1a's forces and l-aunched a counter-attack on
April 7 that virtuall-y wiped out the "Dorados", Villaf s
elite cavalry unj-t.26
The proud, and perhaps stunned, Pancho Villa did not
evaluate the reasons for his defeat. For several days the
Villlstas recuperated while Obregi6n and his troops
stockpiled much needed ammunition and supplies. On April
13, Villa and Obreg6nfs forces met once more on the
battlefield of Celaya. Again, Villa tried a disastrous

frontal cavalry charge.27 His attack was checked by
Obreg6n's machine gun installments. The battle raged on for
more than twenty-four hours. According to John Eisenhower,
the Villistas lost as many as 9,000 soldiers in the battle
for Ce1aya.28 This humiliatingr defeat showed that Vil1a had
a "lack of strategic and tactical- ability on par with
obreg6n. "29

It is hard to imagine any military leader continuing
to fight after having been handed two defeats of the
magnitude Vi11a suffered at Celaya. Vi11a, however, had an
25rbid,

489.
26John S.D. Eisenhower, Intervention!: The United States and
the l"Iexican RenoTution, 79L3-1-91-7 (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, L993), L17.

27stout,

L1.

j-senhower,
29Katz, 540.
28E

L7 9 .
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unlimited supply of courage and confidence, which had often
produced success but at Celaya proved detrimental. In June
of l-915, Vil1a was confronted by Obreg6n near the town of
Le6n. In this battle he recognized a need to change his
tactics and ordered his men to entrench themselves between
Le6n and Trinidad.30

Vj-I1afs new defensive tactic led to a forty-day

batt1e.31 The impatient Vi11a, however, was not used to the
long delays brought about by trench warfare. Determj-ned to
end the standstill, he took his reserve and tried to
maneuver behind Obreg6n's forces. The vigilant Obreg6n had
anticipated Villa's lmpatience and charged the exposed
Villista forces. Approximately 3,000 Villistas were killed
during obreg6n's massive offensj-ve.32 Although the battle
cost Obreg6n an arm, he managed to defeat Vil1a once
again.33 The villistas retreated to Aguascalientes.3a
A month later in July of 1915, Villa fought Obreg6n's
Carrancj-sta army at Torre6n. Vi11a's badly depleted force
was constantly barraged by the i-ncreasing forces. The
rel-entless fighting had taken its to1l on Vi11a's force who
could no longer put up a sigrnificant defense. By the end of
,Ju1y Villa was forced to retreat further north into

30rbid, 494.
3lEisenhower,
32Katz,496.

1-80.

33stout, L6-L7.

34Katz, 496-497.
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Chihuahua.35 With his forces demoralized and depleted,

Vi1la's once 40r000 strong Divlsi6n del Norte began to
dissolve. It would never again be a major military force in
the Mexican Revolution.
In October of 191-5, President Wilson, against the
advice of General Hugh Scott, officially recognized the
Carranza government as the true governing body of Mexico.36
This decision was probably due to the fact that World War I
was raging in Europe and the United States wanted to secure
a peaceful government in Mexico as soon as possible. Seei-ng
that Vi1la and his forces were severely weakened by the
defeat at Celaya, President Wilson thougrht it would be in
Mexicors and the United States' i-nterest to support the
leader who appeared to be the most in controI.37
The timing of Wilson's decision could not have been
worse for Vil1a. In November of 1915 Vi11a tried
desperately to occupy the northwestern state of Sonora.
Villars last hope for maj-ntaining a grasp on his fading
power Iay in this desert state. At a place calIed Aqua
Prieta, Villa faced Plutarco El1as Ca11es, another
Carrancista general.38 The beleaguered Vi11a and his
soldiers were defeated once again. The Carrancj-stas proved
to be too much for them.
35stout, L7.

36Tompkins, 35-36.

37stout, l-8.

38clendenen, Blood on the Border, l-87.
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Vi11a later learned that Calles' army had been able to

rout his Divisi6n del Norte by crossing through Douglas,
Arizona. In an arrangement between Wil-son and Carranza, the
Carrancistas were aIl-owed to ride on American trains.
Moreover, the United States provided the Carrancistas with
powerful military spotlights to il-luminate the approaching
Villistas in the dead of night.3e Needless to sdy, the
Villistas were caught in the middle of the desert without a
place to hide. The death tolI was staggering with Villa
barely making it out al j-ve.
Although the battle at Agua Prieta was not the final
engagement for the Divj-si6n de1 Norte, it was a definite
indicator that the end was coming. After several more sma1l
confrontations with Carranzars troops, the tired and badly
depleted Vll-listas found their way back to the state of
Chihuahua. By December of 1915 the Divisi6n del Norte was
officially disbanded with only a couple hundred of Vil1a's
most Ioya1 troops remaj-ning by his side.40 The glory days
of Villismo were coming to an abrupt end.
Vi11a, by this point, was a very angry man. He was
furious with the United States for having formally
recogni-zed his enemy, Venustiano Carranza, as the official
President of Mexico, for providing the floodlights used
against him at Agua Prieta, and for allowing Ca11es' army to

39Katz, 526.

4oEisenhower, 2Lo.
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be transported across U.S. soil.

By contrast, Vi11a could

not even buy munitions 1egal1y in America.4l vilra was also
angry over the fact that of the thirty states in Mexico that
had once supported both he and fell-ow popular revolutionary,
Emiliano Zapata, now only Chlhuahua favored him. That
support, however, was also waning.42 Nevertheless, VilIa
was far from giving up and retiring to his ranch in
Chihuahua. The once proud and couraqeous leader of the
Divisi6n del Norte had ceased to be a prominent political
figure. In order to survive as a force in Mexican politics,
he decided to become a guerrilla fighter and make his
enemies pay for what they had done to him.
From December 1915 until the raid on Columbus, New
Mexico, Pancho V11la and his group of guerrillas raided,
looted, and extorted money and supplies from ranchers and
miners all along the border between the United States and
Mexico. 3 The mines owned by the Americans, such as the
Cusi mj-ne, and those of other foreign countries were
favorite targets for Vil-1a and his gang. In fact, Vi1l_a and
his men were so famous for their raiding that they were even
blamed for incidents in Arizoyta, Texas, and Mexico in whlch

aLThe American Experience: The Hunt

for pancho Villa,
Written and Produced by Hector Galan and paul Espinosar
min., PublJ-c Broadcasting System, L993, Videocassette.
AzKatz, 533.

43Manue1 Machado

60

Jr., Centaur of the North: Francisco ViJJa,
the Mexican RevoTution, and Northern Mexico (Austin, ?exas.Eakin Press, 19BB), 745-L46.
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they did not even participate.44 The resources from these
raids allowed Vi1la to attack Carrancista troops wherever
possible.

Vi1la's attacks on the mining industry in Chihuahua
were significant for two reasons. The first was to allocate
funds and supplies for his poorly equipped band. The second
was to discourage American entrepreneurs so they would seek
their fortune elsewhere. By preventing a large economic
base in Chihuahua, Villa hoped to further weaken the
Carrancista administration that was trying to occupy the
state.45 The largest problem Vil-la faced with this strategy
was that the general populaLion was unhappy about losing the
jobs and business the mines provided to their communities.
If Villa were to lose the flow of revenue he was extorting
from the mines, then he would flnd it extremely difficult to
fight the Carrancj-sta troops infiltrating into his remaining
domain of Chihuahua. However, losing public support could
hinder his ability to remain outside of Carranzafs grasp.
Much to the chagrin of the Chihuahuan citizens, Villa
decided that it was in his best i-nterest to continue his

raids on the foreign mining operations.46
Although the raids on the mining companies throughout
Chihuahua were creating problems among American

44Hal-deen Braddy , The Paradox of Pancho
Texas Western Press , L978) , 4.
45Katz, 557.

46rbid.

Vil-l-a (El

Paso:

L6

entrepreneurs, Vi11a maintained agreeable re1aLj-onships with

individuals throughout the border towns of the United
States. The majority of these individuals were merchants,
such as businessman Sam Ravel of Columbus, New Mexico, who
provided him with the materials that he needed to supply his
group.47 Putting his anger aside about United States
policy, it was through these merchants that Vi11a purchased
the guns, food, horses, and clothing that were essential to
his raids agai-nst Carranzars forces. Unfortunately, fate
once again frowned upon the struggling Vi11a.
In January of LgL6, at the reguest of the Carranza
giovernment, a train carrying American mini-ng officials,
engineers, and Hispanic assistants headed out of E1 Paso,
Texas on its way to a Chihuahuan mine.48 Beli-eving the
route to be free of bandits, the passengers were being sent
to Mexico to assess the viability of reopening a mine. The
train had just reached a smal1 station east of Chihuahua,
known as Santa Isabel, when it suddenly stopped. A group of
bandits, 1ed by Pablo L6pez of Villars gdn9, swarmed the
traj-n and began dragging the Ameri-cans outside. The
majority were then shot beside the tracks and all of their
possessions were taken from them. The remaining passengers
were left alive, but, they too were robbed of any
some

va1uables.49

aTBraddy, Pancho ViLLa at Col-umbus, 10.
48c1endenen, BJ-ood on the Borderr 198.
AeKatz, 558.
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of the massacre soon reached the united states and
a public outcry for justice coul-d be heard all along the
border. Not wanting to cause an international scene,
President wilson decided i-t was best to Iet carranza handle
the matter himself.s0 However, this event would prove to be
utterly devastatinq for Villa. Even though Vil1a insisted
that L6pez had acted on his own,51 many of the merchants who
had dealt with Villa for several- years, now fearing U.S.
reprisals, ceased all business transactj-ons with him. s2
Without the materials supplied by the American merchants,
Vi1la could not maintain his group of guerrillas and support
his fight against Carranza.
The months that followed the Santa fsabel massacre took
their toll- on Vil1a's men. Large numbers of his luchadores
(fighters) deserted and became members of Carranzats troops
while others simply disappeared. Those who did remain with
Villa were severely demoralized and on the verge deserting
him. According to Haldeen Braddy, "Vi11a needed to revive
News

Soc1endenen, BLood on the Border, 1"99.
slTompkj-ns, 4L. There is some dispute over

Villars rol-e in
this incident. Some historians believe that Vil]a was on
his way to turn himself in to a newspaper man named George
Seese in New Mexico with proof of his innocence in the
matter. Please see Edgcumb Pinchon, Viva VilLa!: A Recovery
of the Real. Pancho VilLa, Peon...Bandit...Sol.drer... Patriot
(New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, L970) , 335336. AIso see Eriedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho
VifJa, 565. However, the author has not been abl-e to
establish whether or not there is any truth with regards to
this story, it may very well be another Villa legend.
52Herbert Mo11oy Mason ,Jr., The Great Pursuit (New York:
Random

House, L97O), 64.

18

his band into the military force it had once been and he
needed more bounty than the countryside of [Chihuahua] had
to offer. "53 The time had come to take drastic measures to
ensure the survival of the Villista cause.
Begrinning in February of 19L6, in a desperate attempt
to gain more capital, the Villistas began to rob, extort, ox
ki11 mostly American ranchers and travelers along the
border. Vi11a also started a campaign of conscripting
former veterans of the Divisi6n de1 Norte back into his
service. If the soldiers refused they were immediately
executed either by firing squad or hanging.54 Now, armed
with as many troops and supplies as he could muster, Villa
set his sights on the border town of Columbus, New Mexico.
The decision by Villa to attack the tiny border town is
not the unsolved mystery that historians such as James W.
Hurst make it out to be. Hurst states that, "There is not
now, and probably never will be, a conclusive answer to the
question [of why Vi1la attacked Co1umbusl.w55 fn addition
to Hurst, author Friedrich Katz also states that "it is not
clear why this sma11 town, consisting maj-nly of wooden
structures...had been chosen as the target of ViIIa's
raid. "56

s3Braddy , Pancho ViJ-l-a at Col-umbus, g.
54Katz , 56L.
55,James I,I. Hurst, The ViLljsta Prusoners of L976-1"91"7 (Las
Cruces, New Mexico: Yucca Tree Press, 2OOO) , L-2.

56Kat2,563.
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However, these writers have failed to take into account

that for

many years

57Haldeen

Braddy, Pershing's

V1lIa had close ties to the town of
Columbus. As mentioned earlier, Sam Ravel, one of the most
prosperous men in the town, had sold the Villistas suppJ_ies
both during and after the revolution. A1so, Vitla had once
been friendly with some of the military personnel garrisoned
at Camp Furlong on the outskirts of town.57 Nevertheless, it
was exactry this familiarity with columbus that made it such
a good target for the desperate bandits.
United States officials had known for some time that
Vi11a was considering attacking American soiI, they just did
not know where the impending raid would take p1ace. The
major consensus was that El- Paso would be the likeJ-y
target.sB Villa had maintained a wife and resj-dence there
during his cattle rustling days before the revolution and
again in 1913.se Due to Vi1la's familiarity with the city,
Fort Bliss, the mili-tary outpost connected to E1 Paso, was
put on alert and began sending daily patrols along the
border for several weeks. Although the anticipated attack
never came, the patrols from Fort Bliss remained along the
Rio Grande.6o

Jul:.ssron

in Mexico (E1 Paso:

Texas Western Press, L966) , 6.
58Mason, 5-6.
SeKatz,1B5-186.
60Araddy, Pancho VilLa at Columbus, 12.
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Furlong, at Columbus, also stepped up its patrols
along the international line.61 However, the townspeople of
Columbus felt that there was little
to worry about.
Camp

According to Hal-deen Braddy, the people of Columbus thought

that Vi11a might attack the town of Palomas in the state of
Chihuahua just over the border from the New Mexico 1ine.62
The military, especially towards the end of February and the
beginning of March 1916, began to lessen their patrols
between the United States and Mexico.
Although many of the residents felt they had little
cause for concern, there were definite warning signals about
an impending attack on Columbus. On March 2, L93-6, there
were three Villistas captured by Carranzars troops near
Casas Grandes, Mexico. These Villistas are reported to have
confessed that they would attack the Mexican town of Hachita
or ColumbuEr New Mexico.63 The Carrancistas relayed this
information to the United States. However, Colonel Slocum,
the commandj-ng officer at Camp Furlong, had received many
reports on Vil1a's whereabouts and could actually prove very
few.

64

the morning of March B, Juan Favela, a resident of
Columbus, rode his horse out to the Boca Grande River to
On

61P1ease see Appendix.

62tbid.

63,Jessie Peterson and Thelma Cox Knoles, Pancho ViLl-a:
Intimate Recol.-lectrons by PeopTe Who Knew Him (New York:
Hastings House Publishers, \977), 2L4.
64Tompkins, 46-47.
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meet the foreman of the Pal_omas Cattle Company, Arthur

McKinney. According to Favela, he had just ridden over the
top of a hill when he saw McKinney and two other employees

of the Palomas Company sitting by the river talking to a
group of Hispanic men. Apparently, Favela recognized pancho
viIla as one of the men talking to McKinney. Just as Favela
neared the encampment, a villista hung McKinney with a piece
of wire and shot the other two hands dead. Favela barely
managed to escape.65
According to Favela, he sent another ranch hand named
Antonio Mufioz to oversee the activities of Vil]a and his
men. Favela learned from Muf,oz that the Villistas were
headed towards columbus.66 Favela then approached another
Columbus citizen, B.M. Reed, with the news. Both Reed and
Favela discussed the matter with Colonel- S1ocum.67
Unfortunately, Colonel Slocum stated that he already
had patrors just south of town as well as verifiable report
that Vil1a was headed south towards the Mexican town of
Gfizman.6S Eave1a insisted that he was brushed off by the

65Peterson, 214-2L5.
Video JournaJ-: Early CoLumbus, N.M. and pancho
ViLTa 's Raid, produced by John and ,Iu1y McCIure, 50 min.,
McVideo Productions, L994, videocassette. There is some
dispute as to whether it was Favela or Mufloz who reported to
Colonel- Slocum. However, the town residents intervj-ewed
maintain that j-t was the well respected Favela.
6TPeterson, 2L6.
6STompkins, 43.
66coJ-umbus
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colonel who just hours later left Columbus for Deming,

New

Mexico.69

Vi11a and his forces had been camped at Boca Grande,

just a few miles south of Columbus, for several days.
During the early morning on March 8, Villa sent Lieutenant
Colonel Vargas to scout out the garrison and the town.7o
While Vargas and his troops were gone, Villa is reported to
have expressed some misgivings about attacking Columbus. He
had accidentally allowed two wj-tnesses to escape, Fave.l-a and
Muf,oz, and was worried that they may warn Columbus of his
location.71 v1Ila decided it was best to wait and see what
Vargas had found out before committing himself to the
attack.
Vargas returned to the camp at Bocas Grandes in the

early afternoon and reported t.hat there were only between
fifty and l-00 soldiers on the post at Camp Furlong.72
Although the report seemed encouraqing, Villa sat in silence
and thought about his course of action very carefully. The
thought of whether or not to trust Vargas' est j-mation must
have troubled the bandit chief. If Vil1a did possess any
doubts, he resolved them by 4:00 P.M. on March 8 when he and
69Peterson, 2L6. Accounts are sketchy, at best, as to the
exact whereabouts of Colonel Slocum during the battle. ,.Tuan
Eave1a insisted that Slocum left Columbus for Demlng, New
Mexico. According to Tompkins' Chasing ViLLa, Pdge 55,
Colonel Slocum is not seen until the Mexican i-nvaders have
been driven out of the town.
7oKatzr 563.
?1Braddy, Pancho
72rbid, r-5.

Viffa at

CoTumbus, 14-15.
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to pack up the camp and head out towards
Columbus.73 Neverthetess, the men still did not know the
exact plan of what was going to transpire once they arrived
at their destination.T4
At approximately one in the morning of March 9, the
determined group of horsemen cut the barbed wire fence that
separated the two countries and ki11ed a night watchman in
Palomas.75 The villistas then proceeded to a dried river
bed that ran parallel with the railroad tracks leading
towards the town of Columbus. It was in this arroyo that
Vi11a is said to have ordered everyone to dismount.
Vi11a ordered the officers of his group to gather
around him so that they could hear about the maneuver he had
developed on the ride towards Columbus. The plan was to
his

men began

develop two columns, one was to attack from the east, the

other was to envelop the town and then advance upon i-t from
the north. Vilta and a sma11 reserve would wait just south
of the military garrison to prov5-de additional support if
needed.76

While Villa and his band were finallzing their plans

for the attack, a young U.S. Army lieutenant named Ralph
Lucas was just coming into Lown on the midnight train out of
EI Paso. Lleutenant Lucas, along with several other
73Ej-senhower, 22L.
7

4Katz,

564 .

75The American Experience: The Hunt

for Pancho Vil-La,

vi-deocassette.
T6clendenen, Blood on the Border, 204.

L993,
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offlcers of the camp, had been in Texas playing po1o. Lucas
had decided that instead of waiting until the next day, he
preferred to ride the rail at night and sleep in hls own bed
back at columbus. The decj-sion by Lucas to come back to
base early possibly changed the outcome of Vi1la's raid.77
Before retiring to his cot for the night, Lucas roaded

his revolver that was unloaded by his roommate who had been
sent on border patrol a few days before.78 The tired
Lieutenant then went to bed only to be wakened a couple
hours later by an unknown person riding past his window.
The sleepy Lucas poked his head out the window and noticed

right away that the person on horseback was not an American
soldier, the person was wearing a Mexican sombrero and was
wielding a rj-fle.7e
while Lucas was thrashing about in his quarters trylng
to get dressed, another soldier, private Fred Griffin, was
on guard duty just across from Lucasr hut when he saw the
villistas and ordered them to ha1t.80 shots rang out and,
although he was mortally wounded, private Griffln managed. to
return fire and kil-I several virlistas before succumbing to
his wounds.81 The raid on Columbus had begun.
There have been many arguments over the exact time the
rai-d commenced. There is a picture, however, of the train
TTTompkins, 5O-52.
78tbid, 51.
79stout, 36.

sotbid.

SLcoLumbus

Video,JournaL, LggL, videocassette.
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depot cl-ock stopped by a buLlet at 4:11 A.M.82 Confirmed by
eyewitness testi-mony, we can assume that the raj_d started

within a few minutes of the ti-me indicated on the clock.
Regardless of the time, Vil1a and his forces must have been
extremely surprised to find that there were actually more
than 300 soldiers at Camp Furlong that night and not the
fifty to 100 as reported by Vargas.83 elthough the cover of
darkness allowed the Villistas to enter the town almost
undetected, once the soldj-ers realized what was happening
and were able to organi-ze themselves, the fighting became
intense.
Thanks to the efforts of Mrs. E.G. Parks, the rest of

the United States learned of the attack within a couple
hours of the initial raid. Mrs. Parks, a night telephone
operator in Columbus, was hit by flying glass and nearly
missed being shot when a group of V1llistas shot up her
office j-n an attempt to sever communications with the
outside wor1d. Mrs. Parks managed to remain at the
switchboard and calIed the Demj-ng, New Mexj-co operator. The
Deming operator was able to sound the alarm, alerting a
group of military personnel stationed at Deming and in
Texas.84 Mrs. Parks was just one of many woman in Columbus
who became heroines for their courage during the raid.

82Braddy, Pancho ViLJ-a at CoTumbus, 17.
83Katz 563.
84stout, 38.
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The gunfire exchanged between Griffin

and Villistas

the officer of the day, Lieutenant Castleman.
Castleman rushed out of his house and coll-ided with a
Villista who tried to shoot the American at point blank
range and somehow missed.85 Castleman, dazed and confused,
returned fire and then headed for the center of town to join
cavalry Troop F. Taking command of the American sordlers who
had made it to his position, Castleman quickly organized a
wakened

counterattack.

86

Meanwhile, the barefoot Lieutenant Lucas managed to
reach the guard tent and removed one of the Benet-Mercier
machine guns.87 Other men quickly joined Lucas, counter-

assaurt on the villista

j-ntruders. According to Lieutenant

Lucas, the Benet-Mercier machine guns were temperamental and
jammed frequently.Se Therefore, as the fight continued,
Lucas and his men were in a constant search for guns and
ammunition.

For more than two hours the battle raged throughout the

dusty streets. The townspeople were hiding in thei_r homes,
in outhouses, and adobe huts. Some of the more confused
souls ran out into the desert and did not stop until they
were exhausted.s9 The previously dark town became bathed in
the orange glow from the flames engulfing the Commercial
85rbid, 36.

s6Tompkins, 52.
87c1endenen, The United States and Vi17a, 24O.
SSTompkins, 52.
89Braddy, Pancho Vi7la at CoLumbus, 31.
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Hote1 in the center of Main Street.90 The glow from the fire

allowed the Americans to distinguish the raiders from

civilians and soldiers as machine gun and rifle fire ripped
through the still desert air. Soldiers and Villistas could
be heard shouting throughout the buildings and streets. The
sleepy town of Columbus became the site of mass confusion
and utter chaos.
Jessie Thompson, the granddaughter of the Commercial
Hotel manager, remembers that her family was awakened by the
commotj-on. The guests of the hotel were all gathered
upstairs when the Villistas broke in and demanded to see Sam
Ravel who was in EI Paso. William Ritchie, the manag€rr
tried te1l the Villistas that Ravel was not in town.
However, upon hearing this, the raiders began to l-oot the
patrons and ordered that Ritchie and three other men be
taken outside and shot. The guerrillas then 1it the
building on fire after thoroughly looting all they coutd.el
Jessie Thompson stood in the hotel with her mother,
grandmother, and the bride of one of the guests who had been
kiIled. The four women were shaking at the events that had
unfolded before their very eyes. Juan Favela, who had been
staying in town that night, rushed in and Ied the women to
an adobe hut owned by his mother in-law.92 Tragically,
9oclendenen, Bfood on the Border, 2O5.
01
--Jessl-e
L. Thompson, 'A Vi-sit from Panchor
Heritage 47, no.8 (1996): 29-3A.
92Peterson, 219.
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Jessie had to step over the top of her dead grandfather in

order to run for safety.93
People fought with anything at hand. Angry cooks, for
example, repel-Ied a group of Villistas trying to break into
Camp Furlong's kitchen and food storage area.94 The cooks
used cleavers, fists and an old shotgun to dissuade the
Villistas from looting the food storage. The stable guards
were no less effective when one of the members used a
baseball bat to subdue one of the raiders.95
By dawn, the rallying efforts of the American machinegiun troop, Ied by the courageous barefoot Lieutenant Lucas,
were far too great for the Vill-istas to cope with.96 Slowly,
the raiders began to pull out of Columbus and head for the
border, taking as many of the wounded with them as they
cou1d. The remainj-ng Villistas had withdrawn from the fiqht
by 7:30 A.M.97 viI1a and about thirty of the reserve
riflemen, who were still hiding in the dried rj-ver bed on
the outskirts of town, released two hostaqes, Maud Hawk
WrightgS and Buck Spencergg, whom they had captured on the
ride north. The reservists led by Vi1la then headed back to
Mexj-co behind their retreating companions.
93Thompson, 30.
94P1ease see Appendix.
9sgraddy, Pancho ViLla
96stout, 36.
97Braddy, Pancho Viffa
98"Woman

at Columbus, 25-26.
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held by Vi1la Nine Days Tells Story of Mexican

" Nehr York Times,10 March L9L6, L-2.
99eraddy, Pancho VifLa at CoTumbus, 31
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wright had been captured by the vlllistas at her
ranch near Colonia Hernandez ni-ne days before the Columbus
p316.100 Mrs. Wright was separated from her husband, who
was never seen again. She was then forced to give her baby
to the mald. To prevent a possible escape attempt, Mrs.
Wright was tied to a mule while the Villistas made their way
towards Columbus.101 It is important to note that Mrs.
Wright actually talked to and identified the leader of the
bandits as Pancho vi1la. According to Mrs. wright, vi11a
had been dressed as a common bandit near the rear of his
band until the night of the attack when he dressed in full
Maud

military attire.102 The testimony of Mrs. Wright proves
that vi11a was present at the raid but remained in the
reserve and did not join in the fighting-103
,Just before the raid ended, Mrs. Wright made a plea to
be released and was granted this request. Together with an
African-American prisoner named Buck Spencer, Mrs. hlright
made her way into town.104 wright came across a badly
wounded woman named Mrs. Moore. Moore's husband had been
k1l-1ed during the first of the raid. Moore ran outside to
help and was struck in the thigh by a bu11et.10s 61lhough

1oo5gor1, 38.

101n14o*.n Held by Vil1a
Raid, " l-.
1o2g1org , 39.
103niJo*.n HeId by villa
104Braddy, Pancho ViLLa
1o5g1""rrhower, 22L.

for Nine Days Tells Story of Mexican
for Nine Days . . . , n 2 at Columbus, 29.
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Wright was exhausted and starvi-ng, she remained with Mrs.
Moore until help arrived.

Major Frank Tompkins, who had remained at his resldence
to protect his family during the raid, decided the time had
come to join the figh1.106 Within twenty minutes Tompkins
had assembled a small mounted troop of about thirty men and
Tompkins stated that
took off after the fleelng Villistas.
300 yards past the border they engaged the rear flank of the
Villistas, reportedly killing some thirty-two enemy

troops.

loT

At this point more men from Tompkins' Cavalry Troop H
had met up with him as well as Cavalry Troop F under the
command of Lieutenant Castleman.108 Tompkins sent a message
to Colonel Slocum, who appeared sometime during the raj-d,
asking if he should continue the pursuit. After a thirty
minute wait a reply of "use your own judgment" came to
Tompkins. l09

the fleeing
Villistas for several miles into the Mexican desert. Major
Tompkins, realj-zing that his men were following a force more
than twice their size into unfamiliar territory, decided
that it would be best to give up their pursuit. Possessing
no food or water, little ammunition, and exhausted horses,
The American Cavalry Troops F and H pursued

lo6Tompkins, 55-56.

1071516.
1o8g1an6enen,

Bl-ood on
lo9Tompkins, 56.

the Border, 206-207
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the Americans sIow1y made their way back to the smoldering
remains of Columbus.11o
While the cavalry was out chasing Vi11a through the

desert the townspeople were burying their dead, caring for
the wounded, and cleaning up the mess. The bodies of the
dead Villistas were stacked like firewood. According to
Mary Lee Gaskil1, the bodies were soaked with gas and then
burned. Children ran about the streets and saw the remains
burning as if they were brush pi1es.11r Some of the
Villistas were not yet dead when the cleanup crew came upon
them. Colonel Slocum is reported to have said "Let them
bake in the ssn. 1112
The school teacher came to town to dismiss class and
never returned. Many people who lived on farms outside of
Columbus were told that the enLire town had been destroyed
and all the residents L111.6.l-13 In the center of town,
where the worst of the fighting had occurred, Iay the
smoki-ng remains of the Commercial Hote1. Within its ruins
were the badly burned bodies of William Ritchie, John Walker
(the honeymooner), and Dr. Hart, a veterinarian from
Texas.114 This was a fresh reminder of the carnage the raid
had caused.
11051es1, 37.

111?6s Amer:can

videocassette.
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The aftermath of the raid left eighteen Americans dead

lost more than ninety
people who lay scattered from Columbus to three miles over
the border. Approximately twenty-two Villistas were taken
and eight more wounded. The Villistas

prisoner, something that Lj-eutenant Lucas was reprimanded
for 1ater.115 Of those twenty-two only seven or eight stood
trial in courts that could hardly be considered fair-116
Those convicted were executed and denied the ability to
appeal.

Vi1la, himself, escaped from Columbus unscathed, but
his troops were defeated. In addition, they lost a large
amount of food, sma1l arms and ammunition, and two BenetMercier machine quns.ll-7 allhough his men pillaged many
goods, they dropped most of them in the desert as they fled
from the pursuing cavalrymen. Villa also lost a number of
extremely valuable Arabian horses that had been stolen from
the United States military, which had been bred for
patrolling the desert.118
The attack on Columbus, New Mexico was not the vengeful
massacre that the newspaper headlines and some historians,
made it out to be.1l-9 gr, 16" contrary, the raid was a well
115Tompkins, 52-53. Lieutenant Lucas was reprimanded for not
having taken enough prisoners. Both Tompkins and Lucas,
considering the circumstances, thought the action taken by
the military in this matter was not acceptable due to the

circumstances.
116gsas1

,

1-B

.
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timed maneuver which failed to inflict

widespread

destructj-on due to the rapid reaction of United States

troops. First of all, the damage to the town was lj-mited to
just a handful of buildings. These buildings included the
two general stores, the Commercial Hotel, the Hover Hote1,
the weapons holding area of Camp Furlong, and a food storaqe
facility at the garrison.120 gns e1 the general stores and
the Commercial hotel were owned by Sam Ravel, the same
merchant who had dealt with the Villistas before.
It is important to note that the raiders did not
disturb any of the private residences of the town. Their
main focus was on the stores and the supply areas for the
goods that they contained. Villa and hls men did attack the
Commercial Hotel. This was an intentional maneuver to rob
the wealthier patrons of their valuables and find Ravel.
Moreover, the majority of the women and children encountered
by the Villistas were left unmo1ests6.121 Tragically, there
was a pregnant woman killed duringr the commotion while
running through the main street. Several civilian and
military men lost their l-ives as weIl.122
The evidence clearly shows that the driving passion of
the Villistas was their dire need of money, clothes, arms,
ammunition, food, and horses. The money and clothes came
Buildings, " New York Times, 9 March L9L6, 1.
lzoBraddy, Pancho Vil-La at Columbus, 3L-32.
L211'6sss is some dispute as to whether Mrs. Moore was raped.
The author has not been able to prove this occurred.
122Braddy, Pancho ViLJ-a at Coiumbus, 29.
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from

Sam

Ravel-fs establishments whereas the arms,

ammunition, food, and horses all came courtesy of the United

States Military.

The limited scope of the Villistas

proves

that Vil1a did not intend to massacre Americans. Had a
civillan massacre been the objective, the Villistas could
have easily wiped out the population of Columbus.
The town of Columbus, New Mexj-co in 1916 was an
isolated and sparsely guarded, yet, well supplied, cluster
of adobe huts and a few wooden structures. The nearest town
of any size, Deming, was more than thirty miles away.123
However, it was exactly this combination of ample supplies
and lsolation that made Columbus "the plum of the New Mexj-co
desert that 1ay susceptible to a surprise attack ripe for
the plucking by hungering querril1u".wt24 In other words,
Vil1a, although terribly brutal, attacked Columbus out of
necessj-ty and convenience, not out of a thirst for revenge.
In response to the attack on U.S. soil-, President
Woodrow Wilson announced on March LL, 1916 that an adequate
force would be sent into Mexico with the single objective of
capturing Vil1a and bringing him to justice.l2s $litson then
placed an expeditionary force of 5,000 troops under the
command of General .Tohn J. Pershing.126 General Pershing
and his Punj-tive Expedition chased Vi11a and his men for
1-2391eu1, 31.
124Braddy, Pancho

VilLa at CoLumbus, 36.
L25rpsssident hlilson Responds to Attack.' New York Times,
March L9L6, 1.-2.
L2617ay7, 567 .
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nine months through the varying terrain of Mexico without
ever catching a glimpse of Villa.
Villa continued to be a thorn in the side of the
Mexican government that had been taken over by his arch-

rival, Alvaro Obreg6n. In 1,920, Vi11a retired from his
heII-raising ways after receivj-ng a settlement from the
qovernment that included a 25r 000 acre hacienda i_n Durango,
Chihuahua and an annual i-ncome of 500,000 pesos.127
However, Vill-a's peaceful retirement was unexpectedly

j-nterrupted.

July 23, L923, Vi11a and several bodyguards were
riding in his Dodge convertible on their way to Parral,
Chihuahua when eight unidentified men ambushed the car and
poured bullets into 11.128 It has long been speculated that
Obreg6n was behind the assassin.11orr.129 Regardless of who
was to blame, death came to Vi1la in the same violent manner
he lived his 1ife, by the gun.
On

1279i""rrhower, 322.
1283-gr6ilre

R. Adams , Liberators and Patru ots of Latin
America: Biograph:.es of 23 -Leaders (,Jefferson, North
Carolina: McEarland and Company, Inc. , L99t), 157-158.
129g1".rrhower, 325.
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